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I. INTRODUCTION
IN JULY OF 1969, three men launched from Cape Canaveral,Florida, headed for Earth’s nearest neighbor: the Moon.1 The
nearly 238,000 mile journey climaxed when astronaut Neil Arm-
strong stepped foot on the lunar surface—the first human to do
so in history.2 Between 1969 and 1972, eleven other men es-
1 Apollo 11 Mission Overview, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/
apollo/missions/apollo11.html [https://perma.cc/Y5GC-A77V].
2 Tim Sharp, How Far is the Moon?, SPACE (June 21, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www
.space.com/18145-how-far-is-the-moon.html [https://perma.cc/LY6H-YTNH].
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caped Earth’s atmosphere and walked on an extraterrestrial
body; yet ever since Apollo 17 left lunar orbit in 1972,3 humanity
has been relegated to an existence solely on Earth, passing year
after year without an off-Earth foothold in our solar system.
In 2012, however, a Dutch media group made international
headlines when it announced an ambitious project to colonize
Mars by 2023.4 According to its website, Mars One will send the
first unmanned mission to Mars no later than 2020, with human
settlers touching down by 2026.5 Though Mars One and its hold-
ing company have come under scrutiny in recent months from
scientists and journalists alike,6 the venture nevertheless poses
an interesting legal question: which nation’s criminal jurisdic-
tion will apply to the colonists if Mars One (or any other com-
pany looking to establish an outer space colony) succeeds in
establishing a colony off-Earth?
The history of colonization on Earth is marred with blood and
tears.7 The history of outer space colonization will (hopefully)
be markedly different. Yet before any future cosmological colo-
nist plants his or her boots on the extraterrestrial soil, two com-
plex legal issues must be addressed before lift-off.
The first issue nations and private companies will face when
mounting a colonization project is whether outer space coloni-
zation is even permitted under the current international and do-
mestic legal frameworks that govern outer space activities.
History contains many examples of national appropriation
claims. From Christopher Columbus landing on the beaches of
the Caribbean, to the global colonial dominance of the British
Empire in the 1700s, to the United States and Manifest Destiny
in the nineteenth century, the past 600 years have seen nation-
states establish outposts and footholds in foreign lands, far away
from the mother country. Over the next 600 years, humanity will
witness the same endeavor, albeit one that takes place not on
3 Apollo 17, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/apollo/missions/
apollo17.html [https://perma.cc/M5FK-SPV4 ].
4 Press Release, Mars One, Mars One Will Settle Men on Mars in 2023 (May 31,
2012), http://www.mars-one.com/news/press-releases/mars-one-will-settle-men-
on-mars-in-2023 [http://perma.cc/VTK9-YYXC].
5 MARS ONE, http://www.mars-one.com/ [https://perma.cc/3TYZ-ACY5].
6 Janey Tracey, Yet Another Scientist Calls Mars One Mission ‘Unfeasible’ and ‘Unsus-
tainable’, OUTER PLACES (Sept. 3, 2015, 11:20 AM), http://www.outerplaces.com/
science/item/9773-yet-another-scientist-calls-mars-one-mission-unfeasible-and-
unsustainable [http://perma.cc/33QF-WYUZ].
7 See generally Robert J. Miller, The International Law of Colonialism: A Comparative
Analysis, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 847 (2011).
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Earth, but on the rocky craters of the Milky Way Galaxy and
beyond. Yet as history has shown, the age of exploration and
colonialism led to strife, fighting, and hardship between differ-
ent peoples and societies.8 But in outer space, nations will be
tasked with upholding the spirit of international cooperation.9
Only through this cooperation will outer space-faring nations be
able to achieve the lofty ideals off-Earth colonization holds.
If colonization falls within the bounds of current legal doc-
trine controlling outer space, then terrestrial societies and inter-
stellar colonists will soon face a far more pressing question:
which nation’s criminal law applies to their celestial outpost?10
Though the initial launch and first years of colonization will be
filled with excitement, discovery, and opportunity, eventually a
thriving outer space colony will run into an issue that plagues
Earth-bound societies: “X infringed on my rights and caused me
harm, and I want to press charges.” In this case, millions of miles
from the nearest court, outer space colonists would be left won-
dering, “Who governs?” “What law applies?” “Who adjudicates?”
This article takes a two-prong approach to determining juris-
diction on the outer space colonies that will be established in
the near future. The first half of the article will briefly address
outer space appropriation and whether a future outer space col-
ony violates the non-appropriation language found throughout
the various international outer space agreements. The second
half will address what criminal jurisdiction framework should ap-
ply once humanity establishes colonies on distant celestial bod-
ies. Part I of this article is the Introduction. Part II of this article
traces the history of European appropriation throughout the
Age of Discovery under the historical international legal princi-
ple Doctrine of Discovery. Part III briefly addresses whether
outer space colonization is permitted under the current regula-
tory scheme governing outer space—particularly through the
lens of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
8 See generally Blake A. Watson, The Doctrine of Discovery and the Elusive Definition
of Indian Title, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 995 (2011).
9 See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
10 This article will strictly address criminal jurisdiction and space colonization;
civil jurisdiction in outer space colonies is a separate topic entirely, but it would
likely be addressed through the same international treaties that currently govern
outer space activities.
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Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). Part IV
and V then pivot, exploring two analogous territories and their
criminal jurisdiction structures that could apply to future outer
space colonies. Finally, Part VI argues for a natural extension of
the current 1998 Intergovernmental Agreements of the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS) to future outer space colonies while
also exploring a number of potential criticisms to such
extension.
II. NORTH, SOUTH, AND CENTRAL AMERICA, CIRCA
1492: THE ORIGINAL FINAL FRONTIER
When Christopher Columbus “discovered” the new world on
October 12, 1492, he came ashore on what many historians con-
sider to be modern day Watling Island in the Bahamas.11 From
his personal journal of the voyage, his priorities once landing
were clear:
The Admiral bore the royal standard, and the two captains each
a banner of the Green Cross, which all the ships had carried; this
contained the initials of the names of the King and Queen each
side of the cross, and a crown over each letter Arrived on shore,
they saw trees very green many streams of water, and diverse sorts
of fruits. The Admiral called upon the two Captains, and the rest
of the crew who landed, as also to Rodrigo de Escovedo notary of
the fleet, and Rodrigo Sanchez, of Segovia, to bear witness that
he before all others took possession (as in fact he did) of that
island for the King and Queen his sovereigns. . . .12
By planting the standard of Spain, Columbus staked a “legal
claim[ ] of ownership and domination over the [newly discov-
ered] lands,” in short, appropriating all he saw for his sover-
eigns, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain.13
A. DEVELOPING THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY: 1492–1850
World history post-1492 is rife with images and stories like Co-
lumbus’s, of intrepid explorers landing on foreign shores and
driving national standards into the soil in the name of Spain,
11 Columbus Reaches the New World, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/columbus-reaches-the-new-world [https://perma.cc/TMN2-W5
ZK].
12 Medieval Sourcebook: Christopher Columbus: Extracts from Journal, FORDHAM U.,
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/source/columbus1.asp [https://per
ma.cc/YU8K-CGNG].
13 Miller, supra note 7, at 858.
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England, Portugal, etc.14 This act, though symbolic, was but the
first step in a complicated system of international law that the
European nation-states crafted into the Doctrine of Discovery.15
Under this Doctrine of Discovery, the conquering nation laid
claim to the discovered lands and all affixed to it, establishing a
national interest in the sovereignty, commercial rights, and title
of the newly acquired lands.16 In essence, the Doctrine of Dis-
covery let the European nations appropriate all that they found,
which in time fostered the establishment of colonies all over the
globe.
1. Native Title and the European Responses
One issue that plagued European claims throughout this “Age
of Discovery” was the native inhabitant’s original title to the
“new” lands the explorers claimed for their sovereign.17 The
Doctrine of Discovery has been criticized by historians and legal
scholars alike as the tool the European powers developed to
“justify the process of colonization and dominion” over the
lands and native populations of the New World.18 Though the
Doctrine of Discovery emerged from Spanish and Portuguese
clashes over territory in the Western Hemisphere, England and
France refined the doctrine, thus developing terra nullius.19 Terra
nullius, or “land belonging to no one,”20 was the theory that for-
eign lands “discovered” by European explorers were vacant of
any preexisting title and, therefore, claimable.21
One major issue with terra nullius was the fact that the Euro-
pean explorers were claiming lands that were not vacant.22 En-
gland, France, Spain, Portugal, the Dutch, and even the United
14 Id. at 873–74.
15 Id. at 854.
16 Watson, supra note 8, at 997.
17 Miller, supra note 7, at 883 (The issue of native title of “discovered” lands
will theoretically not surface once celestial colonies are established, in part be-
cause there will likely be no “native” species already claiming title to the land. In
short, without the existence of intelligent life on the lands colonized on distant
celestial bodies, the issue of native title will not affect the colonizing nation’s
claim on the land.).
18 Watson, supra note 8, at 996–97.
19 Miller, supra note 7, at 864.
20 Taylor R. Dalton, Developing the Final Frontier: Defining Private Property Rights
on Celestial Bodies for the Benefit of All Mankind, CORNELL L. SCH. GRADUATE STU-
DENT PAPERS 21 (Apr. 22, 2010), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/
25 [https://perma.cc/9FJM-VAYU].
21 Miller, supra note 7, at 864.
22 Id. at 878.
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States all contended with native populations that physically in-
habited the lands they “discovered” for their respective nation-
states.23 To combat native title, the European powers circum-
vented previous title holdings either with an outright denial of
occupation, or with a claim that the lands “were occupied but
not being used in a manner [any] European legal system
recognized. . . .”24
2. The United States and Native Title
Immediately after gaining independence from England, the
United States passed a resolution exercising its exclusive control
and rights over the native lands that England had controlled
prior to the Revolution,25 thus establishing the United States’
official and absolute right to lands once held by the British
Crown and now controlled by the newly created United States.
But eventually questions of native title to lands acquired by both
the United States and its citizens reached the highest court in
the new country. In the 1823 case, Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Su-
preme Court directly addressed the Doctrine of Discovery and
Native American title to “vacant” lands.26 M’Intosh centered on a
controversy surrounding the purchase of Native American
lands, which were then passed down once the purchaser died.27
A separate individual, M’Intosh, obtained a land patent from
the U.S. government, and an ejectment action was brought
against M’Intosh.28
Writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall
first traced the history of the Doctrine of Discovery, highlighting
various charters and grants bestowed on the multitude of Euro-
pean explorers who conquered the Americas.29 These discover-
ies of foreign shores would grant exclusive title to the nation
represented by the discoverer, which would subsequently be se-
cure from any other competing European claim.30 Marshall
noted that these charters were unique in that they not only
granted political power to the founding nation, but also granted
the exclusive rights to the land, soil, and waters of the newly
23 Id. at 878–82.
24 Id. at 864.
25 Id. at 881.
26 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
27 Id. at 543–44.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 574–80.
30 Id. at 573.
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“discovered” lands.31 From here, Marshall stated that the Doc-
trine of Discovery diminished the rights of Native Americans to
secure title in the lands they occupied;32 as a result, the power to
grant title to land rested exclusively in the hands of the United
States,33 thus negating any Native American’s claim to the lands
(even though the native populations had been there first, which
would have granted them exclusive control of their lands had
the Doctrine of Discovery applied to them as well).34
The ruling in M’Intosh is paramount to the discussion of ap-
propriation because it firmly established the Doctrine of Discov-
ery in U.S. law.35 As scholar Robert J. Miller points out, M’Intosh
recognized the Doctrine of Discovery as a concrete “law of the
American state and federal governments.”36 By endorsing the
Doctrine of Discovery in M’Intosh, Marshall acknowledged its
power as a legitimate legal principle in U.S. law.37 The Court
thus established, as a legal fact, that discovery meant that when
any European nation (and as a result of the American Revolu-
tion, the United States as well) “discovered” lands unknown to
the Europeans prior to the discovery, “they automatically gained
sovereign and property rights in the lands.”38
B. THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY IN OUTER SPACE?
Like Columbus and the other 15th century explorers, the
outer space colonists of the future will be landing on planets
and celestials bodies for the first time. If the Doctrine of Discov-
ery still applied, this act would trigger a claim of title and sover-
eignty to the lands “discovered.”39 In 1969, when Neil
Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin became the first humans to land on
the Moon, they spent roughly ten minutes completing an activ-
ity closely resembling what Columbus did on the beach in Octo-
31 Id. at 580.
32 Id. at 574.
33 Id. at 587–88.
34 Tonya Gonnella Frichner (Special Rapporteur on the Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues), Preliminary Study of the Impact on Indigenous Peoples of the Inter-
national Legal Construct Known as the Doctrine of Discovery, ¶¶ 32–33, U.N. Doc. E/
C.19/2010/13 (Feb. 4, 2010).
35 Miller, supra note 7, at 851.
36 Id.
37 Patricia Engle, The Origins and Legacy of Justice Marshall’s “New Rule” of Con-
quest in Johnson v. M’Intosh, HISTORY ON TRIAL (Jan. 2004), http://digital.lib.le
high.edu/trial/justification/court/essay/ [https://perma.cc/5PSN-DY5X].
38 Miller, supra note 7, at 851.
39 See id.
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ber of 1492: they erected an American flag, driving it into the
lunar surface in front of a camera broadcasting for the entire
world to see.40
But did the act of planting an American flag on the Moon
constitute an act of appropriation on the part of the United
States? One could argue that because the United States was the
first nation in history to land on the Moon—and “discover,” ac-
cording to the Doctrine of Discovery—the United States gained
authority, control, jurisdiction, and sole title over the Moon
under the Doctrine of Discovery. This worry was so imperative
that prior to the Apollo 11 lunar landing, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) officials established the
“Committee on Symbolic Activities for the First Lunar Landing”
specifically to address whether erecting an American flag on the
lunar surface could be seen as an act of appropriation to other
nations around the world.41
The committee was tasked with selecting “symbolic activities
that would . . . signalize the first lunar landing as an historic
forward step of all mankind . . . .”42 Among the activities pro-
posed included the raising of a United Nations (U.N.) flag, leav-
ing a set of miniature flags of every nation, and establishing a
commemorative plaque on the lunar surface.43 Ultimately, the
committee concluded that only the American flag should be
raised during the mission.44 Many wondered whether the raising
of the American flag would create controversy in the interna-
tional community.45 However, after the flag was raised by Arm-
strong and Aldrin, there were no “formal protests from other
nations [claiming] that the flag raising constituted an illegal at-
tempt to claim the Moon” on the part of the United States.46
One could look to the lack of objections from foreign nations as
a sign that the Doctrine of Discovery would naturally be under-
stood to no longer apply, especially in outer space. In actuality,
the absence of international objection to the flag raising was
due in large part to an international agreement—in part ad-
40 ANNE M. PLATOFF, NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., NASA-CR-188251,
WHERE NO FLAG HAS GONE BEFORE: POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF PLAC-
ING A FLAG ON THE MOON 5 (1993), http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs
.nasa.gov/ 19940008327.pdf [https://perma.cc/F46W-WKE6].
41 Id. at 2.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 5.
46 Id.
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dressing national claims in outer space—that was drafted two
years prior to Neil Armstrong’s first step on the lunar surface:
the Outer Space Treaty.47
III. APPROPRIATE APPROPRIATION: ARTICLE II
OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
To establish a foothold in the solar system away from Earth,
the United States is—at least for the moment—required to com-
ply with the language of the Outer Space Treaty. This means the
first issue plaguing any U.S.-sponsored extra-terrestrial colony is:
would a U.S. colony on a celestial body other than Earth consti-
tute national appropriation, thus violating the terms found in
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty?
A. RETRO-FUTURISM: COLD WAR FEARS AND
OUTER SPACE APPROPRIATION
On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched Sputnik I into outer
space, the world’s first man-made satellite.48 With it came the
fear that if the enemy could launch a satellite into outer space,
what would stop them from launching ballistic missiles up into
outer space and back down onto U.S. cities and military installa-
tions.49 Soon after, however, an equally disheartening issue
arose—one that questioned whether a nation could theoreti-
cally acquire absolute sovereignty over all or a section of outer
space, or a celestial body, such as the Moon.50
As early as 1959, the American Bar Association declared in a
resolution that outer space should be the dominion of all man-
kind, therefore “not be subject to exclusive appropriation” by
any nation.51 In the same year, the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space concluded that if a nation claimed
exclusive rights over celestial bodies, issues between those na-
tions on Earth could arise.52
47 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9; Bureau of Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, DEP’T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5181.htm [https://perma.cc/JW8A-NL5G].
48 FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSON, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 507 (2009).
49 Id.
50 Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty,
33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 421 (1967).
51 Id.
52 Id.
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Partly in response to the growing concern of security, sover-
eignty, and national appropriation in outer space, President
Johnson issued a statement calling for the creation of a treaty
governing the exploration of the Moon and other celestial bod-
ies in May of 1966.53 Among those points outlined by Johnson,
the first dealt with appropriation in outer space: “The [M]oon
and other celestial bodies should be free for exploration and
use by all countries. No country should be permitted to advance
a claim of sovereignty.”54 One month later, Arthur Goldberg,
then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., issued a first draft of a treaty
on June 16, 1966, which echoed Johnson’s remarks, stating in
Article I that “[c]elestial bodies . . . are not subject to national
appropriation by claims of sovereignty . . . .”55 That same day,
USSR Ambassador to the U.N., P. Morozov, wrote a letter to the
chairman of the Legal Subcommittee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, which contained the Soviet’s proposed draft of the
Outer Space Treaty.56 Article II of the Soviet draft contained the
non-appropriation clause, wherein it stated, “Outer Space and
celestial bodies shall not be subject to national appropriation by
claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.”57 Clearly, the issue was worrying enough to place
it at the very forefront of the original drafts of the Outer Space
Treaty.
Less than a month later, on July 12, 1966, the Fifth Session of
the Legal Subcommittee commenced in Geneva where the non-
appropriation language was hammered out.58 Six months later,
in January 1967, the members of the U.N. passed the finalized
draft of the Outer Space Treaty.59 Article II of the Outer Space
Treaty explicitly states: “Outer Space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by
53 Lyndon B. Johnson, 209 – Statement by the President on the Need for a Treaty




55 Letter from Arthur Goldberg to Chairman of the Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (June 16, 1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/
c2/AC105_C2_L012E.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3AF-PXY3].
56 Letter from P. Morozov to Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (July 11, 1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_
C2_L013E.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9PM-4S95].
57 Id.
58 Dembling & Arons, supra note 50, at 420.
59 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. XVII.
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claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.”60
B. ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Outer space law experts have grappled with the meaning and
limits of Article II since just after the adoption of the Outer
Space Treaty. Two years after adoption, outer space law expert
Stephen Gorove wrote an article specifically interpreting the
language, meaning, and extent of Article II.61 Gorove posed
many questions unanswered at the time: Does collecting re-
sources in outer space constitute appropriation?62 Can a nation,
state, or municipality appropriate territory for its own use in
outer space?63 Do private actors not affiliated with nation-states
have the power to appropriate areas of outer space?64 These are
questions that are still relevant—and to an extent, still unan-
swered—in today’s legal environment. Yet the main issue
Gorove examines is that of Article II and its relation to national
appropriation in outer space.
The issue with appropriation is one of language: what does
appropriation mean in the context of the Outer Space Treaty?
Are we to read appropriation as all-encompassing, meaning that
every single object that occupies space in outer space may be
covered under appropriation, thus violating Article II? Or does
Article II only limit nation-states from demarcating specific
tracts of territory in outer space and claiming them as being
under that nation’s exclusive zone of control?
1. Outer Space Settlements and Appropriation
Case law on the subject of outer space appropriation is under-
standably light.65 The history of outer space exploration is also
insufficient to clearly answer the appropriation question, in part
60 Id. art. II.
61 See generally Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, 37
FORDHAM L. REV. 349 (1968).
62 See generally Fabio Tronchetti, The Moon Agreement in the 21st Century: Address-
ing its Potential Role in the Era of Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 36 J. SPACE L. 489 (2010).
63 See generally Gorove, supra note 61, at 352.
64 See generally Claudia Pastorius, Law and Policy in the Global Space Industry’s Lift-
Off, 19 BARRY L. REV. 201 (2013).
65 One case that dealt with outer space appropriation was a 2004 Nevada case,
Nemitz v. United States, No. CV-N030588-HDM, 2004 WL 3167042, at *1 (D. Nev.
Apr. 26, 2004). Nemitz attempted to claim ownership over an entire asteroid, on
which NASA landed a spacecraft in 2001. The court ignored the appropriation
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because man has operated in outer space for less than seventy-
five years. For answers, one must turn to the language of Article
II. Appropriation, according to Gorove, is the “taking of prop-
erty for one’s own or exclusive use with a sense of perma-
nence.”66 Under this legal definition, the language of Article II
would clearly prohibit an individual from chalking out a tract on
the Moon and declaring sole ownership over it.
When he wrote back in 1969, Gorove asked whether the estab-
lishment of permanent outer space settlements—colonies, for
our purposes—would violate Article II.67 Based on his own defi-
nition, Gorove concluded “[u]nder such interpretation the es-
tablishment of a permanent settlement . . . by nationals of a
country on a celestial body may constitute national appropria-
tion if the activities take place under the supreme authority (sov-
ereignty) of the state.”68
Here, Gorove brings up an interesting topic in the appropria-
tion debate: sovereignty. Article II explicitly prohibits “appropri-
ation by claim[s] of sovereignty.”69 Returning to Columbus on
the shores of modern day Bahamas, once he planted his flag
and laid claim to the “vacant” lands—under the Doctrine of Dis-
covery—Columbus declared Spanish sovereignty over the newly
acquired territory.70 In essence, once Spain established sover-
eignty over its new holdings, it gained the power to deny access
to other nations. If this thinking—appropriation by claims of
sovereignty—applied to outer space colonies, then the control-
ling nation would have absolute power to exclude other nations
from entering into and performing activities on the controlling
nation’s celestial claim or base—a flat out rejection of the inter-
national cooperation that the Outer Space Treaty is built
upon.71
2. International Cooperation in Outer Space
For the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as the na-
tions that eventually signed the final document, international
cooperation between nations in outer space was a chief con-
aspects of the case, instead dismissing Nemitz’s claim on the theory that he pos-
sessed no legitimate title to the property in question. Id. at *1–2.
66 Gorove, supra note 61, at 352.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II.
70 See generally Miller, supra note 7.
71 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
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cern.72 As noted above, the Outer Space Treaty originated dur-
ing a time of great conflict between the superpowers on Earth—
the Cold War.73 From the late 1950s into the 1960s, the United
States and the USSR constantly “one-upped” the other in the
Space Race, beginning with the USSR’s launch of Sputnik I.74 In
response to this competition between the two superpowers, as
well as the growing threat of nuclear war, many nations around
the world feared that Cold War actions would directly bleed into
the expanse above Earth.75 To combat this fear, the drafters of
the Outer Space Treaty enacted various articles in the treaty to
ensure that outer space would not be appropriated for military
purposes.76 Even a cursory glance at the language of the Outer
Space Treaty shows a call for international cooperation in the
new and untraversed expanse.77 The opening declarations from
the parties to the treaty highlight this desire for cooperation.78
Among the points listed, the parties commit to: (1)
“[r]ecognizing the common interest of all mankind . . . in the
use of outer space”; (2) “[d]esiring to contribute to broad inter-
national [co]operation”; and (3) “[r]ecalling [U.N. Resolution
1884], calling upon [Member] States to refrain from placing
[nuclear weapons] in orbit around Earth . . . or from installing
such weapons on celestial bodies . . . .”79
This call for international cooperation runs throughout the
Outer Space Treaty, wherein the drafters repeatedly used lan-
guage such as “international [co]operation”80 and “mutual assis-
tance.”81 Nowhere is this more apparent than in Article I, which
states: “Outer space . . . shall be free for exploration and use by
all states without discrimination of any kind.”82 During the draft-
ing of the Outer Space Treaty, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg is-
sued an opinion on the language of Article I, stating “[Article I]
make[s] clear . . . that outer space and celestial bodies are open
72 Letter from Arthur Goldberg, supra note 55.
73 LYALL & LARSON, supra note 48, at 506–07.
74 Id. at 507.
75 Id.
76 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
77 See id.
78 See id. pmbl.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., id. art. I.
81 See, e.g., id. art. IX.
82 Id. art. I
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not just to the big powers or the first arrivals[,] but shall be avail-
able to all, both now and in the future.”83
At the July 1966 U.N. Fifth Session of the Legal Subcommittee
meeting, the delegates spent little time deliberating the lan-
guage of Article II in the proposed drafts.84 This might be due,
in large part, to the fact that all parties involved wanted to en-
sure that outer space remained free and open to all back on
Earth. Indeed, in an address to the U.N. Political Committee of
the General Assembly, U.S. Ambassador Goldberg explained
that the major reasoning for the non-appropriation language of
Article II was to “reinforce the free access language” imposed by
Article I,85 thereby promoting the Outer Space Treaty’s spirit of
international cooperation.
3. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty
The chief concern addressed within Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty was that of one nation appropriating whole tracts
of outer space, thereby limiting the free access to those regions
claimed by that country.86 By denying one nation the opportu-
nity to claim sovereign territory in outer space, whether on ce-
lestial bodies or in the emptiness above, the drafters ensured
that outer space would be free for all, now and into the future.87
The fundamental problem with Article II, though, is that a
colony on the Moon, Mars, or beyond will physically take up
land—land that has yet to be claimed by any nation in history.
By physically occupying territory in outer space, that nation
would indeed be chalking out a place in the moon dust, which
would certainly count as appropriation under both Columbus’s
and Gorove’s definitions.88
Luckily, the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty seemed to
have taken into account the problem Article II poses to nations
attempting to establish outer space colonies when drafting the
final version of the Outer Space Treaty by including Article
XII.89 Article XII states:
All stations, installations, equipment[,] and [outer] space vehi-
cles on the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be open to rep-
83 Dembling & Arons, supra note 50, at 430.
84 Id. at 431.
85 Id.
86 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II
87 Id. art. I.
88 Gorove, supra note 61, at 352.
89 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. XII.
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resentatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of
reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable advance
notice of a projected visit[ ] in order that appropriate consulta-
tions may be held and that maximum precautions may be taken
to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations
in the facility to be visited.90
Here, on first glance, the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty are
simply providing yet another vehicle to ensure that outer space
activities retain the spirit of international cooperation by explic-
itly requiring “all stations, installations, equipment[,] and
[outer] space vehicles” to remain open to representatives of
other nations.91 Yet in doing so, the drafters provide an outlet
for national actors to establish “stations, installations, [and]
equipment” on the Moon and other celestial bodies.92 From a
pure language analysis, one can surmise that an outer space col-
ony on Saturn’s moon Titan would, in fact, operate like a station
or installation, thanks to the language of Article XII.93
Additionally, one can argue that outer space colonies do not
violate the non-appropriation language of Article II because
other parts of the treaty allow for freedom of scientific explora-
tion. In his early analysis of the Outer Space Treaty, Gorove
made a point to separate the use of celestial territory for scien-
tific purposes with the general appropriation of outer space.94
The treaty proclaims in Article I that “there shall be freedom of
scientific investigation . . . and states shall facilitate and en-
courage international [co]operation in such investigation.”95
Gorove posited that appropriation could be allowed under the
treaty if it is done in the name of science.96 “Since the [Outer
Space] Treaty proclaims freedom of scientific investigation in
outer space . . . [and] if the appropriation takes place in the
name of science or in the course of a scientific investigation in
outer space[,] . . . then such use would not be prohibited under
the [Outer Space] Treaty.”97
Currently, all outer space activities undertaken by NASA gen-





94 Gorove, supra note 61, at 352.
95 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I.
96 Gorove, supra note 61, at 352–53.
97 Id. at 353.
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atmosphere, analyzing the effects of living in zero gravity on
human bodies, or gathering scientific data on Mars.98 The focus
of an outer space colony would, at least in the early years follow-
ing its establishment, be skewed toward the gathering of scien-
tific data on the new world—not to mention the study of the
biological effects that the colonists’ new home would have on
their bodies.
Regardless of the activities performed on the U.S. colony, es-
tablishing an outer space colony on Mars would not violate Arti-
cle II’s non-appropriation language. This is good news,
considering that in October 2015 NASA released a detailed plan
calling for the establishment of a permanent human presence
on Mars.99
Yet nowhere in the thirty-six-page plan does NASA address100
which nation’s criminal law will apply to the new settlement—a
major issue facing the future colonists should humanity achieve
off-Earth colonization, millions of miles away from the nearest
police precinct or courtroom.
IV. JURISDICTION IN ANTARCTICA
Outer space colonization will be a wholly different entity than
the Western-centric colonization that engrossed the planet be-
ginning in the 15th century.101 For one thing, outer space colo-
nization will be rooted in a multilateral legal framework that
multiple nations around the world have already developed and
adopted.102 Because of the language of the Outer Space
Treaty—and because the Doctrine of Discovery is an arcane tool
that led to more problems than it solved103—questions of crimi-
nal jurisdiction and whose law governs an outer space colony
currently has no clear answer. Will criminal jurisdiction be
based on international law or will each nation’s colony be under
an extension of the nation’s laws on Earth? Perhaps the answer
98 See generally What Does NASA Do?, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/about/high-
lights/what_does_nasa_do.html [https://perma.cc/8DQW-WLSN].
99 NASA’s Journey to Mars, NASA (Oct. 2015), http://www.nasa.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/atoms/files/journey-to-mars-next-steps-20151008_508.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8LRT-P6V2].
100 This is understandable, when one considers that NASA is not an agency
dedicated to the creation of legal policies. Id. at 1–36.
101 See generally Miller, supra note 7.
102 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl.
103 See generally Frichner, supra note 34.
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lies not in the cold recesses of outer space, but in the cold re-
cesses of Antarctica.
A. U.S. COURT DECISIONS REGARDING ANTARCTICA
A number of U.S. court cases have dealt with Antarctic gen-
eral (civil) jurisdiction and whether U.S. law extends to those
traversing the snowy continent. In 1984, the D.C. Circuit heard a
case that asked: “Is Antarctica, a continent [that] is not now sub-
ject to the sovereignty of any nation, a ‘foreign country’ within
the meaning of the [Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)]?”104 In
Beattie v. United States, an Air New Zealand aircraft crashed in
Antarctica, killing all onboard; plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia against the United
States for wrongful death under the FTCA.105 The D.C. Court of
Appeals looked to the “Nature of Antarctica,” briefly summariz-
ing the points of The Antarctic Treaty (Antarctic Treaty) before
listing the various activities the United States was then engaged
in on the continent.106 The government essentially argued that
there exist two areas of the world—the United States and for-
eign countries.107 The court rejected this thinking, highlighting
other areas that U.S. citizens operate in that are neither option:
outer space, the high seas, and, as indicated in this case, Antarc-
tica.108 The court concluded that under the FTCA’s “foreign
country exception,” Antarctica does not constitute a foreign
country. Because of this, the court determined that venue was
proper, meaning D.C. law applied to the claim.109
Less than ten years later, a carpenter under contract with the
National Science Foundation was killed, instigating a wrongful
death action against the United States.110 Smith v. United States
eventually reached the Supreme Court, which had to ultimately
decide once and for all whether the FTCA applied to tort claims
arising in Antarctica. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist took the opposite approach of the D.C Court of Ap-
peals in Beattie, ruling that the “FTCA’s waiver of sovereign im-
munity does not apply to tort claims arising in Antarctica,”
reasoning that the 79th Congress would not have “included a
104 Beattie v. United States., 756 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
105 Id. at 92–93.
106 Id. at 93–94.
107 Id. at 105.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
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desolate and extraordinar[il]y dangerous land such as Antarc-
tica within the scope of the FTCA.”111
B. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM
From these decisions, one could posit a case with similar is-
sues being filed in U.S. federal or state court, just with Antarc-
tica swapped for an outer space colony on Mars as the cause of
action’s location. This link between Antarctica and outer space
is not hard to see. Both areas share many similar qualities: both
are cold, harsh, and inhospitable. Both regions are also subject
to varying international and domestic treaties that attempt to
provide a legal framework over a barren area.112 The Antarctic
Treaty,113 much like the Outer Space Treaty, was created during
a tense period of history that saw superpowers vying for control
and dominance. The Antarctic Treaty was officially signed and
adopted in 1959;114 likewise, the Outer Space Treaty came a few
years later in 1967.115
1. An Overview of the Antarctic Treaty
As one scholar noted, “[a] major reason for the successful im-
plementation of The Antarctic Treaty lies in its clever mix of
specificity and vagueness,” much like the Outer Space Treaty.116
A side-by-side comparison of the Antarctic Treaty and the Outer
Space Treaty is striking because they both cover similar ground,
and do so in a way that sounds strikingly similar. Article I of the
Antarctic Treaty calls for Antarctica to “be used for peaceful pur-
poses only”;117 so does the preamble of the Outer Space
Treaty.118 Article II of the Antarctic Treaty calls for the
“[f]reedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica,”119 which is
the same language used in Article I of the Outer Space
Treaty.120 Article V of the Antarctic Treaty bans the use of nu-
111 Id. at 204–05.
112 Antarctica Analog Studies, NASA (June 10, 2015), https://www.nasa.gov/
hrp/research/analogs/antarctica [https://perma.cc/UFM9-JUQ3].
113 The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
114 Id.; see also Antarctic Treaty, DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/
trty/193967.htm [https://perma.cc/95PW-R7LL].
115 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl.
116 Kurt M. Shusterich, Antarctic Treaty System: History, Substance, and Speculation,
39 INT’L J. 800, 806 (1983).
117 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. I.
118 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, pmbl.
119 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. II.
120 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. I.
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clear weapons,121 which is a provision mirrored in Article IV of
the Outer Space Treaty.122 And in keeping with the interna-
tional cooperation, Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty allows for
free access to “[a]ll areas of Antarctica, including all stations,
installations[,] and equipment”123—a similar idea contained in
Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty.124
Because of their inherent similarities, both in the form of the
treaty and in the physical properties of both regions, one would
think that Antarctica and its treaty system would be a suitable
model to base outer space colonial jurisdiction. Like the Outer
Space Treaty, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty expressly does
not recognize, dispute, or establish territorial sovereignty
claims.125 Furthermore, the treaty does not allow for any new
claim to be established while the treaty is in force.126 Currently,
seven nations lay “claim” to territory in Antarctica: Argentina,
Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United
Kingdom.127 By the 1950s, eight other nations asserted their in-
terest in the “potential” right to lay claim to Antarctic territory—
Belgium, Germany, Japan, Poland, Sweden, South Africa, the
United States, and the former USSR—but none have officially
made any claims.128
2. General Jurisdiction in Antarctica
Because the treaty does not recognize or establish territory or
sovereignty claims—much like the Outer Space Treaty and its
prohibition on appropriation of territory—jurisdiction over
people and places in Antarctica falls to Article VIII of the
Antarctic Treaty, which provides for general jurisdiction over
observers and scientists by their own nations.129 Article VIII
states: “[T]o facilitate the exercise of their functions under the
present treaty[,] . . . observers . . . and scientific personnel . . .
shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party
of which they are nationals . . . while they are in Antarctica
121 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. V.
122 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. IV.
123 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. VII.
124 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. XII.
125 Id. art. II; The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. IV.
126 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. IV.
127 D. MICHAEL HINKLEY, THE USA, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, AND TERRITORIAL
CLAIMS: IS REASSESSMENT IN ORDER? 1, 8 (1989).
128 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 114, narrative.
129 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. VIII.
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. . . .”130 Nowhere else in the Antarctic Treaty is there any discus-
sion of jurisdiction or prosecutorial power should a crime occur
on the continent.131 Essentially, Article VIII provides that every
scientist, observer, explorer, and tourist in Antarctica is subject
only to the laws of his or her home country; so under the
Antarctic Treaty, an American geologist working on the conti-
nent is subject only to U.S. law.132
This national jurisdiction would be acceptable if there were
some sort of provision detailing a process that Member States
could take in the event of a criminal claim arising between two
Antarctic visitors of different nationalities. But the Antarctic
Treaty provides no concrete plan as to how nations are to coop-
erate in prosecuting a crime involving nationals of different
Member States.133 Instead, a vague provision is included at the
end of Article VIII, which states “the Contracting Parties con-
cerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of juris-
diction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a
view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.”134
C. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF JURISDICTION IN ANTARCTICA
But herein lies the issue with this structure. The Antarctic
Treaty provides for no national enforcement of criminal juris-
diction over any Member State’s bases or installations.135 The
Antarctic Treaty also fails to establish guidelines for interna-
tional cooperation between signatories concerning jurisdiction
and prosecution powers should an incident occur between na-
tionals of different Member States or to a national in or on an-
other nation’s claimed territory.136 Furthermore, the United
States has neither claimed territory in Antarctica nor recognized
any of the territorial claims of the seven nations that have
claimed territory in Antarctica.137 By attaching jurisdiction ex-
clusively to nations, coupled without any grant of territorial ju-
risdiction or clear-cut system of international cooperation in the
event of a criminal incident, the Antarctic Treaty essentially
130 Id. (emphasis added).
131 Id.
132 Id. This type of jurisdictional basis is called the “nationality principle,”
which will be discussed more in-depth in Section V infra.
133 See id. art. VIII.
134 Id.
135 Id. art. IV.
136 Id. art. VIII.
137 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 114, narrative.
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guarantees jurisdiction and prosecution problems will occur
should a crime occur on the continent.
1. The Mysterious Death of Dr. Rodney Marks
Take, for example, the story of Dr. Rodney Marks, an Austra-
lian astrophysicist who died under mysterious circumstances in
2000.138 Marks became increasingly ill over the course of a few
days while working at a U.S.-run research station in Antarctica;
eventually he died and his death was determined to be due to
natural causes.139 By the time Marks died, weather conditions
were too poor to fly his body out of Antarctica, so he was literally
put on ice for six months.140
Eventually, Dr. Marks’s remains were transferred to New Zea-
land by plane and examined by a coroner who found lethal
levels of methanol in his system.141 Based on the coroner’s find-
ings, the New Zealand authorities investigating Marks’s death
could not rule out “that [Marks’s death] was . . . the direct result
of the act of another person.”142 The investigation brings to light
the numerous issues attached to current Antarctic jurisdiction.
The United States had an interest in discovering the cause of
Marks’s death because Marks was a U.S. contractor and his
death occurred on a U.S.-run base.143 But New Zealand also had
an interest in the investigation because the U.S.-run base was
located in the Ross Dependency, one of New Zealand’s territo-
rial claims in Antarctica.144 The case came to a stalemate, in
large part because the Antarctic Treaty fails to establish how
Member States are to cooperate when an incident overlaps the
jurisdiction of different nations.145 As of 2008, the mystery sur-
rounding Marks’s death had yet to be explained,146 but since
138 Todd F. Chatham, Criminal Jurisdiction in Antarctica: A Proposal for Dealing
with Jurisdictional Uncertainty and Lack of Effective Enforcement, 24 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 331, 331–32 (2010).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 332.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 332–33.
144 Id. at 333.
145 Id. at 333–34.
146 Jarrod Booker, NZ Probe into Death Hits Icy Wall, N.Z. HERALD (Sept. 25,
2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_vid=1&ob
jectid=10534046 [https://perma.cc/7G3P-TA78].
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then, many legal experts have called for the reform of Antarc-
tica’s jurisdictional system to avoid future cases like Marks’s.147
2. Dr. Marks in Outer Space?
Imagine, for a minute, that Dr. Marks is an astrophysicist sta-
tioned not in Antarctica, but on a remote colonial outpost on
Mars, where even the speed of current communication technol-
ogy impairs instantaneous communication between Mars and
Earth.148 Dr. Marks’s death highlights the critical need to con-
cretely determine criminal jurisdiction not just in Antarctica,
but in future outer space colonies as well. Furthermore, the
botched investigation and the fallout from Marks’s death, due in
large part to the vying interests of the United States and New
Zealand, highlights the need to establish some sort of coopera-
tive agreement in the event that another tragedy occurs in
Antarctica.
These same issues plaguing Antarctica must be addressed
prior to the first colonists landing on any extraterrestrial surface
to avoid another tragedy like Marks’s, albeit one that occurs bil-
lions of miles from the nearest U.S. district court. But the legal
framework that governs activities in Antarctica is ill-equipped to
apply to outer space colonies. Because the Antarctic Treaty
neither denounces national claims of sovereignty nor establishes
them, Member States have no power to enforce jurisdiction over
non-nationals who instigate incidents in that Member State’s
base or installation. Couple this with the fact that the Antarctic
Treaty provides no system allowing Member States to extend
their criminal jurisdiction over non-nationals, issues as to who
controls—and whose law reigns supreme—will ultimately arise,
especially in the remote regions of Antarctica (and outer space),
where individuals are cut off from the court system, law enforce-
ment agencies, and legislative bodies.
When addressing the legal needs—both current and even-
tual—of outer space, Francis Lyall and Paul Larson argue that
“[t]he temptation, to which we will succumb to occasionally, is
to have recourse to analogy. When considering new problems,
lawyers have an ingrained tendency to analogize from the
known to the unknown, but for the future requirements of
147 Chatham, supra note 138, at 333.
148 See generally Thomas Ormston, Time Delay Between Mars and Earth, ESA MARS
EXPRESS BLOG (May 8, 2012), http://blogs.esa.int/mex/2012/08/05/time-delay-
between-mars-and-earth/ [https://perma.cc/ZAC9-W8JX].
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[outer] space, that tendency may have to be curbed.”149 Thus,
perhaps the laws governing Antarctica might not be the best re-
course for establishing criminal jurisdiction over extraterrestrial
colonial outposts. The answer lies not on the south pole, but in
the sky.
V. JURISDICTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SPACE STATION
The ISS is a football field-sized space station, manned by a
crew of six, orbiting at a speed of five miles per second.150 Offi-
cially completed in 2000, the ISS has hosted over 200 scientists,
researchers, and military personnel from fifteen nations around
the world.151 Since 1998, the ISS has been governed by a multi-
lateral agreement between fifteen nations, referred to as Partner
States in the language of the International Space Station Inter-
governmental Agreement (1998 IGA).152
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
AND THE 1998 IGA
When viewed side-by-side, the 1998 IGA and the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty illustrate just how far humanity has come since
Sputnik I launched into space in 1957.153 Whereas the Outer
Space Treaty contains seventeen articles dealing with nation-
state operations in outer space, the 1998 IGA contains twenty-
eight separate articles.154 Topics discussed in the 1998 IGA that
are not covered in the Outer Space Treaty include “Treatment
of Data and Goods in Transit” (Article 20), “Intellectual Prop-
erty” (Article 21), “Exchange of Data” (Article 19), and “Cus-
toms and Immigration” (Article 18).155
One topic that is outlined in both the 1998 IGA and the
Outer Space Treaty is jurisdiction. Article 5 of the 1998 IGA
149 LYALL & LARSON, supra note 48, at 559–60.




152 Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member
States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government
of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America
Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, Jan. 29, 1998,
1998 U.S.T. LEXIS 303, T.I.A.S. No. 12927 [hereinafter 1998 IGA].
153 Id.; see generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
154 1998 IGA, supra note 152; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
155 1998 IGA, supra note 152.
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states: “Pursuant to Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty . . . ,
each Partner [State] shall retain jurisdiction and control over
the elements it registers . . . and over personnel in or on the
[ISS] who are its nationals.”156 This clause echoes the language
of the jurisdiction and non-appropriation clauses found in the
Outer Space Treaty.157 Furthermore, Article 6 states that each
Partner State “shall own the elements . . . that they respectively
provide.”158
1. Flag Jurisdiction in Maritime Law and Its Outer Space Law
Analogue
Numerous articles have explored whether maritime and admi-
ralty law should apply to activities conducted and objects
launched into outer space.159 One concept from maritime law
that has received attention from outer space law scholars and
practitioners is that of “flag jurisdiction.”160 “Flag jurisdiction de-
rives from the treatment of ships as the sovereign territories of
the nation whose flag they fly.”161 If a ship in international wa-
ters flies an American flag, U.S. law and jurisdiction reigns su-
preme over the vessel, the crew, and any passengers aboard.
This jurisdictional concept stems from “territorial jurisdiction,”
where a state may exercise control and jurisdiction over conduct
that occurs within its territory.162 In short, the law of the nation
where the ship is registered is the law that governs the vessel,
wherein the vessel becomes an extension of the registering na-
tion’s territory.163
Like maritime law, the registration of launched objects is para-
mount to the past, present, and future of outer space explora-
tion. This type of registration is territorial-based jurisdiction
because it establishes that those registered objects launched are
the sole jurisdiction of the launching, or registering, nation.164
In 1967, the Outer Space Treaty established that not only do
156 Id. art. 5.
157 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VIII.
158 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 6, sec. 1.
159 See generally Hans P. Sinha, Criminal Jurisdiction on the International Space Sta-
tion, 30 J. SPACE L. 85 (2004); Stacy J. Ratner, Establishing the Extraterrestrial: Crimi-
nal Jurisdiction and the International Space Station, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. REV. 323
(1999).
160 Sinha, supra note 159, at 94.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 93.
163 Id.
164 Ratner, supra note 159, at 330–31.
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Member States retain this jurisdiction over launched objects, but
they are also internationally liable for any damage caused by
said objects.165 Then, in 1972, the Member States of the Outer
Space Treaty enacted a set of rules governing the liability of
launching Member States when conducting outer space activi-
ties on and off Earth.166 Three years later, the Member States
enacted the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (Registration Convention), which
took the liability rules from the previous two treaties and added
the registration requirements, which concretely attached regis-
tration of objects to liability.167 Simply put, between the three
above-mentioned treaties, any nation that registers and launches
an object into outer space holds jurisdiction over and is liable
for that object.
B. ARTICLE 5 OF THE 1998 IGA: GENERAL JURISDICTION
Article 5 of the 1998 IGA is referred to as the “general juris-
dictional article”168 because it provides a broad grant of jurisdic-
tional control to Partner States.169 The idea of territorial
jurisdiction—and its maritime offshoot, flag jurisdiction—is pre-
sent in Article 5, declaring that “each Partner [State] shall retain
jurisdiction and control over the elements it registers in accor-
dance with [the Registration Convention].”170
Problems arise if territorial jurisdiction is the only framework
that governs inhabitants on the ISS. The ISS is made up of nu-
merous different parts and pieces, all built, registered,
launched, and installed by separate Member States.171 For exam-
ple, there are three separate laboratory modules on the ISS,
each built, registered, and operated by separate Member
States.172 So, hypothetically, if an issue occurs in the U.S. habita-
165 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. VII.
166 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
167 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Sept.
15, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
168 Sinha, supra note 159, at 107.
169 Id.
170 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 5, sec. 2.
171 NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
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tion module that also affects the Japanese lab, then there imme-
diately exists a jurisdictional issue because both the United
States and Japan have competing claims.
To counter this type of incident, a separate and contrasting
jurisdictional principle eliminates the issues of borders and ter-
ritorial claims. This concept is the “nationality principle,” which
states that a nation may exercise control and jurisdiction over
any of its nationals abroad.173 Like territorial jurisdiction, the
nationality principle is also present in Article 5, wherein each
Partner State shall have control and jurisdiction “over personnel
in or on the [ISS] who are its nationals.”174 Here, unlike territo-
rial jurisdiction, a U.S. citizen in China who commits an offense
is subject not only to Chinese jurisdiction attached to the terri-
tory in which the offense was committed, but also to any U.S. law
because his citizenship attaches U.S. jurisdiction to him, thus
allowing the United States to also regulate his conduct.
Like the problems facing an ISS controlled only by territorial
jurisdiction, there too exist problems with a nationality princi-
ple-only approach to jurisdiction on the ISS. Unlike many un-
manned objects that are registered and launched into outer
space, the ISS is essentially a giant satellite that houses individu-
als of differing nationalities.175 If an interaction between individ-
uals from different Partner States were to occur—initiating a
legal cause of action—then, under the nationality principle,
both nations would have a stake in exerting jurisdiction over the
perpetrators; but if the interaction also occurred in a third Part-
ner State’s module, without territorial jurisdiction tied to the re-
gistration of that element, that third nation would be estopped
from exerting jurisdiction. The nationality principle also en-
sures that Partner States retain jurisdictional control over their
citizens even if that citizen is not currently present in his Partner
State’s registered modules.
Without territorial jurisdiction, an issue arising in one regis-
tered section of the ISS by individuals of differing nations would
lead to quarrels about which Partner State’s law governs the inci-
dent. But without the nationality principle, Partner States would
be left out of exerting jurisdiction over incidents occurring be-
tween its nationals if it occurs in a module not registered and
controlled by them. Article 5 of the 1998 IGA solves this di-
173 Sinha, supra note 159, at 95.
174 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 5.
175 REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 171.
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lemma by “[linking] a Partner [State’s] ability to exert its juris-
diction over individuals on board the ISS to registration and
nationality.”176
C. ARTICLE 22: CRIMINAL JURISDICTION ON THE ISS
Luckily, the drafters of the 1998 IGA took jurisdiction a step
further than the general jurisdiction of Article 5. Article 22
states that “Canada, the European Partner States, Japan, Russia,
and the United States may exercise criminal jurisdiction over
personnel in or on any flight element who are their respective
nationals.”177 This grant of power to the Partner States to estab-
lish and enforce criminal jurisdiction aboard the ISS repre-
sented a major shift in the legal framework of outer space
activities.178 Yet between the creation of the original Intergov-
ernmental Agreement for the ISS in 1988 (1988 IGA) and the
rewrite that occurred in 1998, Article 22 underwent significant
changes—changes that shifted the power to exercise criminal
jurisdiction and prosecute inhabitants from a U.S.-centric re-
gime to a more cooperative agreement.
1. 1988 IGA Article 22
In 1988, the original Partner States (excluding Russia, who
joined the ISS endeavor in the mid-1990s after the fall of the
USSR) drafted a first set of Intergovernmental Agreements,179
which included Article 22, outlining criminal jurisdiction
aboard the ISS.180 With the signing and ratification of the 1988
IGA, criminal jurisdiction in outer space went from the realm of
academia and science fiction into concrete international law.
The 1988 version of Article 22 can be broken down into two
main jurisdictional categories: (1) criminal jurisdiction based on
the territorial and nationality principles; and (2) a grant of crim-
inal jurisdiction extending over all of the ISS, possessed solely by
176 Sinha, supra note 159, at 107.
177 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 22 (emphasis added).
178 Sinha, supra note 159, at 87.
179 Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Gov-
ernments of Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of
Japan, and the Government of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design,
Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil
Space Station, Sept. 29, 1988, Temp. State Dep’t No. 92-65, 1992 WL 466295
[hereinafter 1988 IGA].
180 Id. art. 22.
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the United States.181 Section 1 of the 1988 Article 22 reads: “The
United States, the European Partner States, Japan, and Canada
may exercise criminal jurisdiction over the flight elements they
respectively provide and over personnel in or on any flight ele-
ments who are their respective nationals . . . .”182 Present in Sec-
tion 1 is both the territorial jurisdiction (“jurisdiction over the
flight elements”)183 as well as the nationality principle (“jurisdic-
tion . . . over personnel in or on any flight elements who are
their respective nationals”).184 This grant of territorial jurisdic-
tion as well as the nationality principle ensured that the Partner
States retained the option to exercise control over both their
personnel and any incident occurring aboard their respective
flight elements.
But the 1988 IGA also provided the United States alone with
an extraordinary amount of power over the ISS. Section 2 of
Article 22 provided that the United States “may exercise crimi-
nal jurisdiction over misconduct committed by a non-U.S. na-
tional in or on a non-U.S. element of the manned base or
attached to the manned base.”185 With such a grant of power,
the United States was free to exert control over any individual
stationed on any part of the ISS, regardless of nationality or
physical location onboard the ISS.186 Section 2, Subsection A
and B provided that to prosecute a non-national, the United
States must first consult with the Partner State whose national
caused the alleged incident and either retain the “concurrence”
of the Partner State or have failed to receive indication that the
Partner State will prosecute its national.187
This grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States was
unprecedented. As many have noted, Section 2 had no clear ba-
sis in any particular jurisdiction principle, due in large part to
the ambiguity the clause creates in its presentation.188 Further-
more, the extraordinary grant of jurisdiction to the United
States constituted a flagrant disregard not only to the interna-
tional character of the ISS venture, but also to the language of
181 Id., see Sinha, supra note 159, at 109.
182 1988 IGA, supra note 179, art. 22, sec. 1 (emphasis added).
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. art. 22, sec. 2.
186 Sinha, supra note 159, at 112.
187 1988 IGA, supra note 179, art. 22, sec. 2.
188 Sinha, supra note 159, at 114.
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international cooperation set forth in the Outer Space Treaty
twenty-one years prior.189
2. 1998 IGA Article 22
With the arrival of Russia, the Partner States reassembled in
1998 to redraft portions of the 1988 IGA. The drafters elimi-
nated territorial jurisdiction in Section 1 of Article 22 and re-
placed it with a clear, concise nationality-principle-approach to
criminal jurisdiction,190 allowing a Partner State to “exercise
criminal jurisdiction over personnel in or on any flight element
who are their respective nationals.”191
With the elimination of territorial criminal jurisdiction in Ar-
ticle 22, Section 1 came the issue of Partner States not having
the authority to exercise jurisdiction and prosecutorial power
over non-nationals that commit an offense against its own na-
tional. Recall, for a moment, the jurisdiction clause in the
Antarctic Treaty, wherein Member States retain jurisdiction over
their personnel but not over their bases or installations.192 With-
out the ability to regulate conduct within one nation’s installa-
tion (territory)—whether on the ISS or in Antarctica—
tragedies, like Dr. Marks’s, turn into catastrophes where compet-
ing states vie for jurisdiction and where potential wrongdoing is
never investigated nor punished.
To eliminate the issue of Partner States being unable to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a non-national, the drafters of the 1998
IGA, in addition to redrafting Section 1, significantly overhauled
Section 2 as well, providing the following in Section 2:
In a case involving misconduct on orbit that: (a) affects the life
or safety of a national of another Partner State or (b) occurs in
or on or causes damage to the flight element of another Partner
State, the Partner State whose national is the alleged perpetrator
shall, at the request of any affected Partner State, consult with
such [Partner] State concerning their respective prosecutorial in-
terests. An affected Partner State may, following such consulta-
tion, exercise criminal jurisdiction over the alleged perpetrator
provided that, within 90 days of the date of such consultation or
within such other period as may be mutually agreed, the Partner
State whose national is the alleged perpetrator either: (1) con-
curs in such exercise of criminal jurisdiction, or (2) fails to pro-
189 Id. at 115.
190 Id. at 116.
191 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 22, sec. 1.
192 The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113, art. VIII (emphasis added).
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vide assurances that it will submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.193
This grant explicitly gives Partner States affected by an incident
involving a non-national the ability to request jurisdiction and
prosecution power over the non-national. As one scholar noted,
“[t]his is a much improved method of allocating the actual exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction between the primary . . . and the
secondary or affected . . . Partner States.”194 The 1998 IGA—
specifically Article 22—is “the only positive source of criminal
law that currently exists in outer space.”195 Under Article 22,
each Partner State retains jurisdiction over its nationals, regard-
less of where they are currently located on the ISS.196 The
scholar also noted that the language of Article 22, Section 1 sim-
ply states that no matter “where on the ISS a Partner [State’s]
national may commit an offense, that Partner [State] has pri-
mary criminal jurisdiction over such national.”197
D. THE BRILLIANCE OF ARTICLE 22
Discussions on the 1998 IGA have focused on the excision of
the grant of U.S. supreme jurisdictional power in the 1988 IGA
from the 1998 IGA,198 but with regard to criminal jurisdiction in
future outer space colonies, the decision to excise territorial ju-
risdiction from Article 22 of the 1998 IGA is incredibly impor-
tant. Movement in outer space is fluid, not rigid; astronauts
aboard the ISS move freely between separately registered mod-
ules. To have jurisdiction based on territory and international
borders on the ISS is arcane, considering that astronauts easily
move from one nation’s registered module to another sepa-
rately registered module. By attaching jurisdiction to individuals
per Section 1 and allowing for the transfer of jurisdiction and
prosecution powers over one national to a separate Partner
State per Section 2, Article 22 establishes a simple, clear frame-
work for criminal jurisdiction. Article 22 of the 1998 IGA will
likely be the foundation on which humanity will base all future
outer space jurisdiction.199
193 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 22.
194 Sinha, supra note 159, at 119.
195 P.J. Blount, Jurisdiction in Outer Space: Challenges of Private Individuals in
Space, 33 J. SPACE L. 299, 312 (2007).
196 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 22.
197 Sinha, supra note 159, at 117.
198 See generally Blount, supra note 195; Sinha, supra note 159.
199 Sinha, supra note 159, at 120.
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The future of outer space exploration will almost certainly in-
clude outer space colonies established, operated, and populated
by nationals of nation-states that are signatories to the 1998 IGA.
Unlike the ISS, which orbits only 220 or so miles above Earth,200
the outer space colonies of the future will, at least for the near
future, be cut off from most legal resources on Earth for ex-
tended periods of time, if not forever.
This theory sounds extreme, but look no further than the ef-
forts of Mars One to see the reality of this issue. Mars One em-
phasizes that human colonists will live on the colony planet for
the rest of their lives.201 Once they blast off, they will never again
set foot on Earth. Hopefully, the colonists will thrive in their
new environment. Eventually, however, some problem will likely
occur between two or more colonists, triggering, at best, a civil
cause of action or, at worst, a criminal action (a terrifying
thought).202 If the latter occurs, what then? Which nation-state
on Earth exercises jurisdiction? It is for this reason that outer
space colonial criminal jurisdiction must be explicitly defined
and established before any colonist leaves Earth. And Article 22
of the 1998 IGA is the perfect solution to these questions.
200 Remy Melina, International Space Station: By the Numbers, SPACE (Aug. 3, 2010,
4:49 PM), http://www.space.com/8876-international-space-station-numbers.html
[https://perma.cc/8GAH-GELK].
201 Sarah Cruddas, Mars One: ‘We’re All Going to Die, But It’s Important What You
Do Before You Die’, CNN (Feb. 18, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
02/17/tech/mars-one-final-100/ [https://perma.cc/7CSA-8DK8].
202 During the early years of the United States’ quest to send men to outer
space, a chief concern was “space madness,” a mental state many believed might
arise when astronauts were subject to the isolation and inherent dangers associ-
ated with outer space travel. Jeremy Hsu, Why ‘Space Madness’ Fears Haunted
NASA’s Past, DISCOVERY NEWS (Apr. 16, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://news.discovery
.com/adventure/activities/space-madness-120416.htm [https://perma.cc/E536-
UPHM]. In response, NASA stepped up screening of the astronauts culled from
military service; as a result, the majority of U.S. astronauts that were and continue
to be sent into outer space have military backgrounds in an effort to maintain a
sense of professionalism and bravery in the face of the danger. Id. But with the
advent of outer space tourism and Mars One-like colonization endeavors, more
and more citizens with little or no military training will be subject to the rigors of
life in outer space, heightening concerns of outer space criminal incidents occur-
ring between astronauts and colonists as the result of the stresses posed by life
away from the relative safety of Earth. Id.
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VI. A SOLUTION: TRANSFER ARTICLE 22 TO FUTURE
OUTER SPACE COLONIZATION ENDEAVORS
“Criminal [j]urisdiction can be a slippery thing: a crime can
be blatantly committed, but if there is no entity with jurisdiction
to prosecute the crime[,] then it can go unpunished.”203 This
problem exponentially increases with outer space colonization
due in large part to the distance between the Earth-bound
“mother” state and her extraterrestrial colonies.
A. THE DISTANCE BETWEEN FUTURE COLONIES AND
“MOTHER PLANETS” EXACERBATES CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION PROBLEMS
On any given day, the Moon is approximately 238,000 miles
away from Earth.204 The Apollo astronauts endured a three-day
journey to the Moon and another three to get back home.205
But three days is practically instantaneous compared to the aver-
age travel time between Earth and Mars. Current rocket science
allows for, at best, an eight-month trip between Earth and
Mars.206 Furthermore, due to the difference in orbits around the
sun, current technology allows for the “opportunity to embark
[on a mission] to Mars [once] every [twenty-six] months.”207 So
if a crime were to occur on a Martian colony that required extra-
dition of the accused back to Earth, then at best he or she would
have to wait roughly eight months, at worst almost three years—
nevermind the Sixth Amendment issues here for U.S. colonists.
During the age of exploration and the advent of the Doctrine
of Discovery, once the European powers had discovered and
claimed their lands in the new world, the first issue that arose
was which law governed.208 This will be the first question asked
once humanity leaves Earth and establishes a foothold in outer
space. Colonists in 1500 C.E. Florida asked and colonists in 2100
203 Blount, supra note 195, at 306.
204 Tim Sharp, How Far is the Moon?, SPACE (June 21, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://
www.space.com/18145-how-far-is-the-moon.html [https://perma.cc/LY6H-YT
NH].
205 Matt Williams, How Long Does It Take to Get to the Moon?, UNIVERSE TODAY
(Jan. 10, 2016), www.universetoday.com/13562/how-long-does-it-take-to-get-to-
the-moon/ [https://perma.cc/Q2ZB-HB69].
206 Mars Planning Frequently Asked Questions, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/of-
fices/marsplanning/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/N57C-A74B].
207 Id.
208 Dieter Dorr, The Background of the Theory of Discovery, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
477, 479 (2013).
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C.E. Mars will ask, “which legal rules should apply to the relation
between the [colonies] and the [home] states?”209
To answer this question, one must determine whether the re-
lationship between the nation-state and the colony is governed
by domestic or international law.210 Luckily, the outer space col-
onists will have an easier time than their colonial ancestors when
answering these questions. Because the Outer Space Treaty is a
body of international law, international law will continue to
dominate interactions and activities in outer space for the fore-
seeable future.211
1. The Problem with a Territorial Jurisdiction-Only Approach to
Outer Space Colonies
The bestselling novel The Martian, recently made into a block-
buster film, briefly touches upon the laws governing outer space
interactions, particularly that of a “colonist.”212 The novel tells
the story of one American astronaut left stranded on the Mar-
tian surface for years after his crew mistakes him for dead dur-
ing a freak Martian sandstorm. After surviving on the planet for
close to four years, the stranded astronaut ponders what law ap-
plies to his self-made “colony” while cut off from Earth:
I’ve been thinking about laws on Mars . . . . There’s an interna-
tional treaty saying no country can lay claim to anything that’s
not on Earth. And by another treaty, if you’re not in any coun-
try’s territory, maritime law applies. So Mars is “international wa-
ters.” NASA is an American non-military organization, and it
owns the Hab. So while I’m in the Hab, American law applies. As
soon as I step outside, I’m in international waters. Then when I
get in the Rover, I’m back to American law. Here’s the cool part:
I will eventually go to Schiaparelli crater and commandeer the
Ares 4 lander. Nobody explicitly gave me permission to do this,
and they can’t until I’m aboard Ares 4 and operating the
comm[unication] system. After I board Ares 4, before talking to
NASA, I will take control of a craft in international waters with-
out permission. That makes me a pirate!213
Essentially, this passage implies a territorial-based jurisdiction
over installations and vehicles in which the main character lives,
209 Id. at 479.
210 Id. at 479–80.
211 Space Law, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/
spacelaw/index.html [https://perma.cc/SGM9-TFAC].
212 See generally ANDY WEIR, THE MARTIAN (2011).
213 Id. at 259–60.
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works, and ultimately survives. If the “international treaty” that
the main character refers to is in fact the Outer Space Treaty,
then the legal basis would technically be sound, considering we
have seen that Article II of the Outer Space Treaty forbids ap-
propriation.214 Yet this passage above highlights the problem
that would occur should territorial jurisdiction be the only crim-
inal jurisdictional concept attached to outer space colonies.
If territorial jurisdiction were to govern colonial bases in
outer space, the territory would be only the physical installation.
Therefore, if an incident were to occur outside the installation,
then the law of the installation’s registering state would not ap-
ply because the registering or controlling state’s law cannot ex-
tend outside the registered object; if it did, then that would be a
clear violation of the non-appropriation article in the Outer
Space Treaty. However, if Article 22 of the 1998 IGA applied to
outer space colonies as well, then any incident involving a na-
tional occurring outside the physical installation would fall
under the jurisdiction of at least one state because the national-
ity principle embedded in Article 22, Section 1 attaches a Part-
ner State’s jurisdiction to any of its nationals, irrespective of
where the incident occurred. This would mean a Mars colony
governed by an Article 22-like provision would (sadly) defeat
any claim of space piracy, a la´ The Martian.215
2. The Benefits of the Nationality Principle in Outer Space Colonies
Applying the nationality principle-based jurisdiction of Article
22 to outer space colonies is the natural extension. For one
thing, the 1998 IGA was specifically drafted to govern activities
in outer space, whereas the Antarctic Treaty only deals with an
Earth-based region. Likewise, the application of Article 22
214 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, art. II (this is assuming that Weir is imply-
ing that the “international treaty” to which his main character refers is in fact the
Outer Space Treaty. On a separate note, this passage also implies that Mars is
“international waters,” which would be technically incorrect, considering that in
1979 a number of nations convened and drafted the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which attempted to
overlay the principles outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea to outer space, but it was met with overwhelming disapproval by the rest
of the world, particularly from the outer space-faring nations. See generally
Tronchetti, supra note 62).
215 Not to say that “space piracy” is technically impossible; theoretically, once
the technology exists for private ventures, an individual living on a colony could
certainly renounce his or her citizenship and plunder the stars, though this is
unimportant to the argument at hand. See WEIR, supra note 212.
286 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
defeats Lyall and Larson’s conclusion that the future of outer
space law should be governed not by analogy, but by concrete
law tailored for the troubles of outer space. Furthermore, apply-
ing not only Section 1 of Article 22, but also Section 2—dealing
with the transfer of jurisdiction to other Partner States—ensures
the continuation of international cooperation that the original
Outer Space Treaty and the subsequent agreements strongly
promote.
But perhaps the biggest reason to apply the 1998 IGA and not
the current Antarctic Treaty is that the Antarctic Treaty does not
explicitly outline criminal jurisdiction on the continent.216 The
1998 IGA, conversely, not only provides a general jurisdictional
grant to Partner States,217 but also has an entire article devoted
to criminal jurisdiction on the ISS.218
To have an outer space colony governed primarily by territo-
rial jurisdiction would perhaps lead to the “closing off of [outer]
space,” which is the very fear the drafters of the Outer Space
Treaty felt would occur should appropriation of outer space be
permitted. Once bases are cordoned off, what would stop those
registered owners on Earth from denying access to non-nation-
als? Attaching a nationality-based criminal jurisdiction to indi-
viduals and not borders ensures the freedom of movement and
cooperation that has marked outer space exploration for more
than sixty years.
3. A Few Potential Problems Plaguing Outer Space Colonies
One criticism that has surfaced regarding Article 22 of the
1998 IGA is the vagueness surrounding the term “personnel.”219
In 2001, Dennis Tito became the first tourist to visit the ISS as a
guest of the Russian government.220 Technically, Tito was not
enlisted in the military, nor was he a scientist or researcher
(though he previously worked for NASA as an engineer).221 Tito
was simply a tourist in every sense of the word. If something had
happened to Tito, would he have been considered “personnel,”
even if he held no certification or training from NASA or any
216 See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 113.
217 1998 IGA, supra note 152, art. 5.
218 Id. art. 22.
219 Blount, supra note 195, at 313.
220 Id. at 302.
221 Jim Slade & Willow Lawson, World’s First ‘Space Tourist’ Lifts Off, ABC NEWS
(Apr. 29, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=98612 [https://
perma.cc/9ZL9-3F83].
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other Earth-based outer space agency? Moving forward, if Arti-
cle 22 of the 1998 IGA is going to apply to future outer space
colonies on the Moon, Mars, and beyond, then personnel must
be explicitly defined. As the language of Article 22 currently
stands, personnel would likely include only those living and
working on the colony, not intergalactic tourists or visitors.
Perhaps the best course is to redefine personnel as any indi-
vidual currently housed in or on the outer space colony, to be
all-inclusive. If personnel were limited to those individuals oper-
ating in a scientific or administrative capacity in the colony, then
it would limit not only those colonists who brought spouses and
children to the outer space colony, but also those like Dennis
Tito who are visiting the colony in a tourist-only capacity. With
the outer space tourism industry growing with each passing day,
it is not hard to imagine tourists vacationing on far-flung outer
space colonies.
Yet another response might be: “how is jurisdiction going to
be enforced on the new outer space colony on Mars?” This criti-
cism returns once more to the distance issue. With the control-
ling nation-state billions of miles away, the nearest law
enforcement agency and court attendant will be hard pressed to
enforce the court’s will on a transgressor colonized on Mars.
This is not a problem the legal field can fix. Instead, science and
technology will solve this conundrum by continuing to develop
faster and more convenient technology that allows for a better
link between the colony and Earth.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the lead up to the creation of the Outer Space Treaty,
many writers and legal scholars felt the legal principles that
evolved from the exploration of Earth’s surface would be “po-
tentially applicable” to outer space exploration and expan-
sion.222 The conclusion reached was that the application of
terrestrial laws on outer space was not desirable.223 From this
thinking came the Outer Space Treaty, which has guided man-
kind’s expansion into outer space since the treaty’s enactment.
Quoting the late Neil Armstrong, soon humanity will make its
next “giant leap” further into outer space by establishing
manned colonies away from Earth. Theorists and legal experts
will have to grapple with the establishment of a new set of laws
222 Dembling & Arons, supra note 50, at 421.
223 Id.
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and jurisdictional boundaries on these far away colonies. Per-
haps one instinct will be to mirror the law of Antarctic outposts
on Earth. But as has been shown, the Antarctic Treaty’s jurisdic-
tion solution is ill-equipped to handle the stresses and unique
issues that extraterrestrial colonies place on the legal system. For
this reason, the answer to outer space colonial jurisdiction lies in
the already created, tailor-made-for-outer-space Article 22 of the
1998 IGA.
